We explain Canadian target rate decisions using macroeconomic variables as well as Bank of
Introduction
The recent history of Canadian monetary policy is well-suited for a case study on central bank communication. Starting with the first oil crisis in 1973, Canada's inflation rate was 4 percent or higher. After introduction of the inflation target regime (IT) in 1991, the Bank of Canada (BOC) became successful in keeping inflation below 3 percent. However, the move to the IT and the emphasis on reducing inflation rates was accompanied by, perhaps even contributed to, a weak economic performance (Curtis, 2005) . In addition, several steps intended to enhance central bank transparency have been taken: from September 1998 onward, the Bank of Canada has intervened in the foreign exchange market only under exceptional circumstances. In September 2000, it introduced "fixed announcement dates" (FADs); previously, target rate 1 changes could effectively occur on any business day. Council. Usually, these communications contain an 18-24-month-ahead economic outlook for the Canadian economy. In recent years, it also has become common practice to indicate the future course of BOC monetary policy. The more formalized channels, such as statements and monetary policy reports, are used infrequently (eight and four publications per year, respectively) and thus it is chiefly speeches that are the main channel for conveying new information to private economic agents. Canadian financial market returns and volatility are significantly affected by these less formal types of communication (see Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010a ). This paper combines two branches of the existing literature. One of these branches deals with estimating monetary policy reaction functions or Taylor rules (Taylor, 1993) for Canada. Curtis (2005) calculates a Taylor rule and finds that the constant term and the reaction to the current core CPI inflation rate are declining over time (1987-1994 and 1995-2000 subsamples) , reflecting the success of the IT. The coefficient of the change in the 1 The Bank of Canada used the bank rate as the key policy rate until April 2001; thereafter, the overnight rate. For the sake of simplicity, we use the term "target rate." 2 The Bank of Canada had four key objectives when it introduced the new system for announcing target rate decisions: reduced uncertainty in financial markets, more emphasis on medium-term monetary policy, increased transparency regarding the BOC's interest rate decisions, and greater focus on the Canadian rather than the U.S. economic environment (Parent et al., 2003) . 3 Until 1999, the monetary policy report was published semi-annually as in the United States.
Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar (CAD/USD) exchange rate becomes insignificant in the second subsample, suggesting that the BOC no longer tightens the target rate to prevent a depreciation of the exchange rate. Finally, the BOC eases its monetary policy stance when the unemployment rate is higher than its natural rate. This coefficient is increasing over time, mirroring the enlarged scope of expansionary monetary policy after the reduction in the average rate of inflation. Muscatelli et al. (1999) use recursive least squares to estimate a Canadian Taylor rule for the period . When the federal funds rate is included in the equation, the coefficients for expected inflation and output gap are insignificant. The authors also restrict the sample to the period after the money supply targeting regime in Canada (1982-1996 subsample) , which yields significant and positive coefficients for the output gap and the CAD/USD exchange rate, but not for inflation expectations. Fougere (2001) concludes that BOC monetary policy is characterized by both forward-looking and backwardlooking behavior after the introduction of the IT. His estimates also reveal that the BOC gives significant weight to output stabilization, since the coefficient on the output gap is about 40 percent of the summarized inflation gap coefficients. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2008) estimates a real-time forward-looking Taylor rule for the period 1988-2007. The coefficient of the inflation forecast is significant in all specifications and larger than unity when the federal funds rate is not included. The output gap is either insignificant (once he allows for interest rate smoothing) or unexpectedly negative, suggesting misdirected monetary policy. Changes in the CAD/USD exchange rate do not significantly explain interest rate setting.
The second relevant branch of the literature involves incorporating communication into a Taylor rule for the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Fed. Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) construct an indicator measuring the "hawkishness" of the ECB based on counting the number of relevant words in the monthly press conference statements. Integrating this wording indicator into a Taylor rule ordered probit model, they show that it can improve the model's fit. However, a model solely based on this indicator performs worse than the baseline Taylor rule. Jansen and de Haan (2009) examine whether ECB communication is useful in predicting its policy decisions. Using ordered probit models, they find that statements about the main refinancing rate and future inflation are significantly related to interest rate decisions. An out-of-sample evaluation shows, however, that communication-based models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting decisions. Lapp and Pearce (2000) investigate the information content of asymmetric directives in post-meeting statements for the likelihood of intermeeting changes in policy during the Greenspan chairmanship. They show that a bias in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy decisions significantly affects the probability that the target will be changed in the period between two meetings. Pakko (2005) examines the predictive content of post-meeting statements in a Taylor rule setting. He finds that statements convey information useful for forecasting changes in the federal funds target rate, even after controlling for policy responses to inflation and the output gap. Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010b) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the construction of our communication indicators and the other variables, as well as the econometric methodology. Section 3 studies the extent to which communication helps explain and predict target rate decisions. Section 4 presents further specifications and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Econometric Methodology
Our analysis takes advantage of a new data set introduced by Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010a) an undervaluation of the Canadian dollar can be seen as indirect indications of a future rate hike; however, speeches presenting a bright economic outlook (in terms of GDP growth or positive employment news) can also be read as an indication of future rate hikes because in good economic times, the BOC needs to take steps to prevent the economy from overheating. Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010a) point out that the BOC typically does not talk extensively about rate cuts and thus a speech about a negative economic outlook can be a particularly useful indicator of this possibility. 5 We employ a ternary variable for every communication event that takes the value +1 when the central bank leans toward a rate hike, 0 when the monetary policy will likely remain unchanged, and -1 when loose monetary policy is a strong possibility. We thus include information that refers either directly to the future course of monetary policy or indirectly via inflation pressures, an undervalued currency, or the economic outlook. Our sample contains 5 In a very few cases, a positive economic outlook coincides with a trend toward loose monetary policy or a pessimistic outlook is communicated together with tighter monetary policy. As the monetary policy stance is a more direct indicator of future target rate decisions, these rare cases are coded based on the information about the monetary policy stance. 6 Our approach of restricting the coding to directional indications is generally in line with most extant literature (for an extensive literature overview, see Blinder et al., 2008) . A few papers (e.g., Rosa and Verga, 2007) , however, use a finer grid that is suggestive of magnitude of the inclination. Furthermore, there are several available indicators (unfortunately, however, not for the BOC) that attempt to assign a continuous spectrum to communication events, one example being the monetary policy communicator provided by the Swiss Economic Institute after every ECB post-meeting statement. However, a finer grid or a continuous indicator is difficult to construct out of communications other than the post-meeting statements. The former are not very standardized and thus content analysis software-which would be required for the construction of a finer grid-fails to detect finer systematical patterns in these communications. We could also use a scale up to +2 (down to -2) when both monetary policy and economic outlook point in the same direction. As pointed out earlier, the BOC gradually increased the frequency and the content of its communication during our sample. So, a scaling up to +2 could distort the results as earlier speeches sometimes lack a monetary policy part. Furthermore, it is questionable whether an indication via both variables makes a rate change more likely. Finally, some preliminary estimations show that the +1/0/-1 coding approach is more appropriate. 7 During the sample period, there are only two intermeeting periods with conflicting signals in BOC communication. Robustness tests show that results do not change when we explicitly control for the dispersion in communication. Furthermore, in our view, four indications of higher monetary policy, for example, do not result in a four-times-higher probability of a rate hike. Consequently, we use the +1/0/-1 scale and ensure the validity of our results with extensive robustness tests. Compared with the actual target rate decisions, there is an upward bias in the data that is chiefly due to those communications expressing an overly optimistic economic outlook, as in times of unchanged monetary policy our indicator is sometimes positive (see Figure 1a ). Our econometric methodology employs a discrete choice variation of the interest rate setting rule proposed by Taylor (1993 In our definition, a "correct prediction" implies that the outcome to which the model assigned the highest probability is what actually occurred. 9 Auxiliary regressions show that the first, eighth, ninth, and tenth lags of core CPI inflation rate, the first and third lags of the unemployment rate, and the first lag of the deviation of the CAD/USD exchange rate from its long-run trend are strong instruments. Tests for overidentification and weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997 ) support this instrument choice.
decisions. To ensure stationarity of our variables (Hu and Phillips, 2004) , we apply both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) . The results consistently show that the first differences of the core CPI inflation rate and the unemployment rate, as well as the CAD/USD gap, 10 are stationary (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
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Econometrically, we use an ordered probit model to account for the discrete nature of Canadian target rate decisions (Jansen and de Haan, 2009; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010b) . Our specification is:
where the dependent variable is the latent continuous variable representing the change in the BOC target rate at meeting t. Again, we use a ternary variable (+1 represents a rate hike; 0 an unchanged rate; -1 a rate cut) to describe the change in monetary policy.
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Target rate changes occur only if the value of the index function is either below a lower unobserved threshold τ 1 or higher than an upper unobserved threshold τ 2 .
Our Taylor rule incorporates three groups of explanatory variables. First, lagged target rate decisions are included to capture interest rate smoothing behavior (α 1 ).
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The impact of changes in the federal funds target rate since the previous BOC meeting (in percentage points) is described by α 2 (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for a comparison of Canadian and U.S. 
where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and z t is our vector of explanatory variables. The ordered probit models are estimated by maximum likelihood (Maddala, 2006) and the threshold variables are obtained simultaneously with the vector of estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables β.
Explaining and Predicting BOC Target Rate Decisions with Communication
In this section, we present the results of our empirical estimations employing different specifications based on Equation (1). Column (1) of Table 1 shows the model based on
Canadian macroeconomic news only, Column (2) incorporates BOC communication variables only, and Column (3) uses both types of information. Measured by the pseudo R 2 , the joint model (Column (3)) has a slightly better fit than the macro model in Column (1), whereas the communication model (Column (2)) shows the smallest explanatory power.
Interest rate smoothing is evident in all three specifications, as lagged target rate decisions help explain current ones. In all specifications, there is a positive impact of movements in the U.S. federal funds rate since the last BOC meeting. The coefficients of changes in the core CPI inflation rate and the unemployment rate are significant in the Taylor rule model and they remain significant at a 10 percent level in the joint model. The CAD/USD gap is also significant in Models (2) and (3), with similar coefficients. An increasing core CPI inflation rate and a decreasing unemployment rate lead to higher interest rates as the BOC reacts either to contain inflationary pressures or to stabilize the business cycle, respectively. In 14 We evaluated several other variables reflecting the economic conditions in Canada-monthly GDP and several variations of it, the IVEY purchasing manager index (available since December 2000), and the quarterly capacity utilization rate-but none of them performed as well in explaining target rate decisions. 15 The use of the monetary conditions index and some variations of it did not reveal significant coefficients. The index was used by the BOC until the end of 2006 to guide monetary policy decisions. It was constructed as a weighted sum of the changes in the short-term interest rate (the 90-day commercial paper rate) and the exchange rate (as measured by the Canadian-dollar effective exchange rate index) from a given base period.
the case of an undervalued currency (with respect to its long-run trend), the BOC tightens monetary policy so as to strengthen the Canadian dollar. These results deviate somewhat from findings of Curtis (2005), Muscatelli et al. (1999) , Fougere (2001) , and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2008) as in each of those studies at least one macroeconomic variable is not significant. In the Taylor rule specification of Model (1), a one-point higher value for the last target rate decision 18 increases (decreases) the probability of a hike (cut) today by 21 (14) percentage points (pp). A 1 pp change in the U.S. target rate during the intermeeting period exerts a large influence on today's rate decision (-60 pp for cuts; +102 for hikes). A 1 pp higher core CPI inflation rate raises (lowers) the chance of a rate hike (cut) by 25 (15) Finally, a 1 percent undervaluation of the Canadian dollar with respect to its long-run trend raises (reduces) the probability of a rate hike (cut) by 4 (2) pp. When using only communication variables to explain BOC decisions, the importance of interest rate smoothing decreases (-13 pp for rate cuts; +15 for rate hikes), as does that of U.S. influence (-54 for cuts; +62 for hikes). Some information in the lagged rate decisions is captured by the influence of lagged post-meeting statements. A one-point change in the last statement causes a rate cut (hike) to be less (more) likely by 7 (8) pp. The speeches and testimony indicator affects the probability of target rate movements in a similar way (-9 pp for rate cuts; +10 for rate hikes). In the joint model, lagged Canadian and U.S. target rate decisions significantly influence the probabilities of all three categories. The average marginal effects of speeches and testimony as well as those of statements become less significant and insignificant, respectively.
Due to unavailability of appropriate data, we cannot study the out-of-sample performance of the models. However, to approximate an out-of-sample assessment, we reestimate Models (1)- (3) initially for the subsample 1998-2003 and predict target rate decisions for the remaining period using a recursive window of out-of-sample forecasts that requires re-estimating the model after every period.
19 Table 3 shows that the predictive ability of the Taylor-rule-based Model (1) is the best, as 18 out of 24 interest rate decisions are correctly anticipated. For instance, all hikes are correctly predicted, whereas Models (2) and (3) fail to forecast two hikes. Instead of using recursive-window estimations that update parameters in every period, we can test temporal stability by estimating parameters over the period 1998-2003 and then 19 We start by estimating each model using the first 36 observations and then evaluate whether the model correctly predicts the interest rate decision at t = 37. Next, we re-estimate the models using the first 37 observations and predict the outcome at t = 38, and so on.
using the resulting models to derive predictions by plugging in values for the relevant variables in each period. Table 4 shows that the communication model (Model (2)) performs best when holding coefficients constant, whereas the other two models, especially Model (3), deteriorate in predictive ability. Testing parameter instability using Chow-type tests at a 5 percent confidence level (see Figure 2) does not permit rejecting constancy in the case of the Taylor rule model (Model (1)) or the communication model (Model (2)). These results suggest that both models are robust and reliable devices for predicting BOC target rate decisions, even out of sample. Table 5 ). Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 % level. Huber/White robust standard errors are used.
Before December 2000, target rate changes could occur on any business day and often replicated a Fed decision taken the day before. (1)- (3) (see Table A3 in the Appendix) shows that the communication variables remain significant, whereas some of the macroeconomic indicators become insignificant. These results are driven by the pre-FAD period where communication is a good predictor of the next interest rate decision, i.e., there is communication when a rate change is imminent and there is no communication when the BOC has decided to leave its target rate unchanged.
Next, we focus on the question of whether U.S. variables improve the explanatory power of our model. Regardless of whether the BOC attempts to act independently of the Fed, Canada is closely integrated in real and financial terms with the United States, and the Canadian economy very much depends on the economic situation in its large neighboring economy. Therefore, U.S. news could be important in explaining interest rate decisions in Canada. Models (1)- (6) of Tables 1 and 5 show that federal funds target rate movements, which occur in the period between two meetings, significantly and robustly explain BOC rate decisions.
In Table 6 Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 % level. Huber/White robust standard errors are used.
U.S. macroeconomic variables and Fed communications are insignificant in Model (7) and provide no additional explanatory power. There is collinearity between U.S. and 
Conclusions
In this paper, we explain BOC target rate decisions by means of macroeconomic variables as 
